First International Workshop on Incentive Based Computing (IBC'05)

September 19, 2005, Compiègne, France
http://ibc05.cs.wayne.edu/

CALL FOR PAPERS

held in conjunction with the 2005 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI/IAT'05)
http://www.hds.utc.fr/WI05/ and http://www.hds.utc.fr/IAT05/

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The emergence of the Internet as a global platform for computation and communication has sparked the development and deployment of large-scale open distributed systems. The scale of such systems entails a large and heterogeneous set of users with often divergent motives. At the same time, open systems give users increased power to operate in pursuit of local interests, even at the expense of global system objectives. To retain the fast pace of innovation facilitated by open systems while ensuring their long-term reliability and scalability, it is essential that we design efficient protocols that are robust in the presence of self-interested agents. This need has motivated the recent interest in the study of incentives in many areas of distributed computing such as: resource allocation in computational grids, peer-to-peer systems, task scheduling, congestion control, routing and multi-agent systems. Making incentives an explicit aspect of system design represents a revolutionary change in computer science. The great challenge in this area is to design incentive compatible protocols that are computationally tractable and consistent with other application requirements. Research in this area is often cross-disciplinary, borrowing knowledge from economics, computer science, computer engineering and game theory. IBC'05 represents a timely opportunity to bring together a community of researchers involved in economics, game theory and computing. It will allow researchers to present current and on-going work as well as to exchange research ideas and future directions in the emerging field of incentive based computing.

Topics of interest include, but not limited to:
- Algorithmic Mechanism Design
- Incentives in Grids
- Incentives in Peer-to-peer Systems
- Incentives in Networks
- Incentives in Multi-Agent Systems
- Incentive based resource allocation
- Economic models in distributed computing
- Incentive engineering
- Game theoretic modeling
- Resource allocation games
- Strategyproof computing
- Market-based protocols

IMPORTANT DATES

Deadline for paper submission: July 15, 2005
Notification of acceptance: August 7, 2005
Deadline for camera-ready papers: August 15, 2005

PAPER SUBMISSION AND PUBLICATION

All submitted papers will be evaluated on relevance, technical quality, and exposition. Papers must not have appeared before in a journal or conference with published proceedings, nor may they be under review or submitted to another conference or workshop. All accepted papers will be published in the workshop proceedings as regular papers. Submitted papers should be limited to 10 pages formatted using the IEEE Computer Society style: http://www.computer.org/cspress/instruct.htm
Please email the PDF file containing your manuscript to dgrosu@cs.wayne.edu.